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This research uses neighborhood characteristics (at the zipcode level) in 1990 to explain
toxic releases in 1993.  It combines the Toxics Release Inventory data with demographic
data from the 1990 US Census.  We first analyze the location of manufacturing facilities in
a particular neighborhood using a sample selection model, and then estimate the relationship
between releases in 1993 and the demographic characteristics of the neighborhood in 1990.
We conduct the analysis for the entire US as well as for different geographic regions to study
regional differences in determinants of environmental outcomes.  Releases in non-urban
areas of the southeastern US exhibit a pattern suggesting that race might be an important
determinant of release patterns.  Economic characteristics of neighborhoods (such as income
levels and unemployment) also affect releases. Our variables that proxy the propensity for
communities to engage in political action exert greater influence on environmental outcomes
in non-urban areas.
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I. Introduction
The traditional methods of command and control regulation have been
ineffective at worst and costly at best. Recognizing the need to make
regulations more flexible,  in  the past  decade Congress  and regulators have
started to favor innovative and more market based approaches to regulation.
The use or proposed use  of  tradable permits for controlling acid rain and
more recently for mitigating global warming exemplify this trend toward
more flexible and  market  oriented approaches.  The use of public  information
is yet another  innovative environmental policy tool.  While  economists
pushed  for  the adoption of tradable permits by appealing to its cost
effectiveness, policy makers adopted public information disclosure without
prodding by economists.  Congress was inspired by an industrial accident in
Bhopal, India when it passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act (EPCRA) in 1986.  EPCRA requires all manufacturing facilities
to make public their releases of over 320 toxic chemicals.  The underlying
premise of public disclosure as an environmental policy tool is that public
knowledge of pollution can engender effective and informed participation
by various constituencies to exert pressure on facilities to improve their
environmental performance.
Public knowledge  of  environmental data can be used   by consumers to
boycott products, or it may be used by investors to penalize large polluters
(Hamilton, 1995b; Konar and Cohen, 1997).  Neighborhood characteristics
may also influence enforcement actions by regulators.1  This paper analyzes
the role of communities in influencing environmental outcomes. We examine
the potential impact  of public disclosure on  the  environmental  performance
of facilities by studying how community characteristics such as race and
gender, economic status and variables expected to capture political action
influence subsequent toxic releases.  A number of studies have concentrated
1 For an informational model of Occupational Saftey and Health Administration enforcement,
see Scholz and Gray (1997).
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on  the relationship between  race  and  environmental outcomes to determine
the extent of environmental injustice.2  In the present paper we find   evidence
of  environmental injustice,  and  we  also examine the effects of other
community characteristics  in  influencing environmental results.
We combine the Toxics Release Inventory data with demographic data
from the 1990 US Census. We use neighborhood characteristics (at the
zipcode level) to explain toxic releases in 1993, controlling for releases in
1990.  Releases in a particular  year are determined simultaneously with
the demographic characteristics of  a  neighborhood,  and  they  change
over time for a variety of reasons—including facility relocation, expansion
and downsizing, as well as in response to community characteristics.
Because the releases in 1993 are determined after the demographic
characteristics were determined in 1990, it is reasonable to treat the
demographic characteristics as exogenous with respect to these later
releases.
We first analyze the location of manufacturing facilities in a particular
neighborhood using a sample selection model.  This first stage relates the
likelihood that a neighborhood experiences any toxic releases to the
characteristics of that neighborhood.  We then attribute the level of
emissions in 1993 to the demographic and socio-economic characteristics
of the neighborhood in 1990.  We conduct the analysis for the entire United
States as well as specific geographical regions.
The analysis captures three distinct aspects of the communities to assess
the role that each plays in influencing environmental outcomes.  First we
consider the racial, immigrant and gender composition of neighborhoods.
Our results indicate that a larger percentage of non-white residents may be
2 For previous research, see Anderton et al. (1994), Bryant and Mohai (1992), Bullard (1983
and 1990), Goldman and Fritton (1994) and Been (1994).
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associated with a higher level of releases in the southeastern states, primarily
in non-urban zipcodes.3  We also examine the relationship between
economic characteristics and environmental outcomes.  Economic factors
(such as median income and unemployment rates) have a significant impact
on toxic releases, particularly in the southeastern states.  Finally, we examine
variables expected to be associated with the political activity and preferences
of the community and its ability to collectively oppose firms that may harm
the local environment.  While we use voter turnout data and data on
environmental initiative voting for California, for the rest of the US we use
demographic variables as proxies to represent a community’s propensity for
collective action and its political preferences.  These variables appear to
influence environmental outcomes mainly in non-urban areas.
II.Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Construction
Hamilton (1995a) presents a careful description of three alternative
explanations for pollution patterns resulting from capacity expansion plans
for commercial hazardous waste facilities, and we adopt his framework to
motivate our empirical hypotheses.  The three explanations are (1) race/
gender related, (2) the Coase theorem and (3) the theory of collective action
(Olson, 1965).  In the first explanation, facility owners and operators
consider the race and gender composition of neighborhoods and increase
releases in neighborhoods with a greater minority (and perhaps immigrant)
population, or with a greater fraction of female-headed households.  In its
pure form, this leads to greater releases in some neighborhoods that
otherwise (from a pure profit-maximizing standpoint) would not experience
greater releases.
3 As documented in Section IV. D, only in the southeastern states do racial minorities
commonly represent a large proportion of total residents in non-urban areas.
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Alternatively, in a world without transaction costs the Coase theorem
suggests that releases will increase in neighborhoods in which the releases
will do the least damage. According to this hypothesis, releases will be greater
in neighborhoods with  lower rent.  Higher incomes may also increase the
costs of increased releases in a given neighborhood.4  Rental values and
income levels are correlated with education and race, so releases could
increase in minority neighborhoods  merely because they   affect lower-
valued property and lower wage earners.  Our analysis controls for rental
values and income in an attempt to sort out these alternative explanations.5
Finally, firms may decide to increase releases in a given neighborhood
because they face less (political) collective action in that neighborhood.
Residents in different neighborhoods vary in  their  ability  to overcome
free-rider problems  and engage  in collective action.  Again, this could result
in outcomes that appear similar to  the race/gender-related  explanation if,
for example, minority or immigrant neighborhoods are less politically active.
To distinguish between these explanations  we include some variables that
are likely to affect incentives to engage in collective action   (such  as the
fraction of  households with children);  and   in a model based on California
data only we include some direct measures of political action and
environmental preferences—voter turnout and vote results on an
environmental initiative. While we can use voting data for California, due to
data limitations for other regions (discussed below) we rely on a combination
of demographic variables to proxy for collective action.
4 From the polluter’s perspective, higher property values and incomes increase the damage
from releases because in litigation, injured parties could recover damages based on reduced
property values.  In the case of adverse health impacts that limit work ability the injured
parties could recover lost income.
6 This is a different point than stated by Been (1994).  She argues that releases in a
neighborhood decrease property values, which then attract minority populations.
Econometrically,  this suggests that neighborhood characteristics may be endogenous to the
determination of releases.  This is precisely why we use 1990 characteristics to explain
1993 releases; see Section 3.4.
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Strong correlations exist between many of our explanatory variables,
which creates a classic multicollinearity problem.  This problem has the
potential to cause incorrect statistical inferences regarding individual
coefficient estimates. This potential arises because although individual
coefficient estimates are unbiased, variance estimates are inflated due to
the multicollinearity. To sidestep this problem we focus on joint tests of
significance to test the three alternative hypotheses. In particular, we employ
the Wald test in a series of hypothesis tests of the form Ho: Rb=r, where R
is a matrix that creates a joint test that specific elements in the parameter
vector b are all equal to zero (r is a vector of zeros). We choose three
different R matrices  to test each  of  the three  explanations  described
above.
To summarize, these alternative theories predict that only certain
variables should explain toxic releases. The race/gender hypothesis posits
the null th at factors such as race, gender and the foreign-born composition
of a neighborhood do not predict  releases. Rejection of the null implies
that these factors are important and supports  the race/gender  hypothesis.
The economic (Coase theorem) hypothesis postulates the null that economic
factors such as income levels, rental values, vacancy rates, unemployment
rates  and the  proportion of poor households do not explain changing
release patterns.  Rejection of this null supports what we shall refer to as
the economic/Coasian  explanation for changing release patterns. Lastly,
the political/collective action  hypothesis posits  the null that variables
related to the political action   propensity  of  local  residents  do  not
predict releases. In addition to voter turnout and expressed preferences
through environmental initiative voting (for California only), we include
variables such as age, education and the number of households with
children.6  These factors can be reasonably expected to influence the
6 Recall the incident at Love Canal, where an elementary school was built on a toxic dump.
That caused a public outcry when the chemicals started seeping from the walls and affecting
children.
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incentives and tendency to engage in political action (e.g., see Filer et al.,
1993).7  Rejection of this political/collective action null supports the
hypothesis that such variables associated with the political activity of local
residents influence environmental outcomes.
We focus on hypothesis tests for these three sets of variables as a group,
and then also interpret the significant individual variable effects.  We
recognize that our classification of variables under the different hypotheses
is not exact.  For example, the proportion of foreign-born residents may be
associated primarily with the race/gender hypothesis, but it may also be
considered a factor that influences the extent of community activism.  Our
presentation of individual coefficient estimates permits the reader to assess
the implications of alternative groupings.8
III. Data and Model Specification
We combine the Toxics Release Inventory with the US Bureau of the
Census data and determine the relationship between the releases in a particular
zipcode and demographic attributes of that zipcode.  We use data for nearly
30,000 zipcodes, including all zipcodes with residential population according
to the US Census.
7 Filer et al. (1993) use variables such as education, age and income to explain voter turnout.
In the set of political/collective action variables, we also include several factors that potentially
affect or reflect local environmental preferences.  We include the percentage of residents
who carpool because carpooling for some may represent a contribution to a community
public good or pro-environmental preferences.  The percentage of residents employed in
manufacturing industries and the percentage of residents who rent rather than own their
residences are also included in the set of political action variables because these variables
could influence the incentives for residents to oppose expansions in local manufacturing
facilities.
8 We should also note that because of the inexact variable classification and the
multicollinearity present in these demographic data, our Wald tests of joint significance of
each set of variables could be sensitive to alternative groupings.
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A. The Toxics Release Inventory
Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (1986)
requires manufacturing establishments (Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) 20-39) to report their releases and transfers of 320 toxic chemicals.  The
Act requires facilities that manufacture or process more than 25,000 pounds
or use more than 10,000 pounds of any of the reportable chemicals to submit
a TRI report [EPA (1992)].  Our main results aggregate air, land, water and
underground injection releases, and do not include toxic chemical transfers.
[Section IV. E. briefly discusses models estimated for toxic transfers and
releases disaggregated by release medium.]  Arora and Cason (1995) compare
two methods of chemical aggregation—one weighting all chemicals equally
and another that accounts for the chemicals’ different toxicity.  Most of the
toxic chemicals that are widely used have similar toxicity [EPA(1989)], so the
results were not sensitive to the weighting scheme.9  Therefore, here we simply
aggregate the chemicals and employ equal weights.10
In addition to the environmental data, each facility reports its location,
primary SIC code and parent company.  We employ the zipcode of the facility
location to merge these data with the Census data.  Note that our measure of
environmental outcomes is based on releases and not exposures.  Exposures
differ from releases due to the geographic dispersion of households and
releases within each zipcode.  We do not attempt to analyze exposures here
as it would entail very elaborate mappings using the census tract and a
geographical information system.  Given the scope of our study (for the entire
US) this exercise is prohibitively expensive.  Note also that since the analysis
9 Indeed, EPA has not assigned risk scores to many of the less toxic chemicals on the TRI
list, which makes differential weighting problematic.
10 A limitation of the TRI data set is that it is self reported so there may be an incentive to
under-report the releases.  There may also exist an incentive to over-report if firms expect to
be rewarded for improvements relative to a baseline emission level.  Nevertheless, at present
it is the best available dataset that provides a comprehensive analysis of toxic release patterns
for the entire US.  While there is some non-reporting it appears due to ignorance and not
evasion (Brehm and Hamilton, 1996).
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is conducted at the zipcode rather than at the firm level, it is not possible to
control for industry since multiple facilities (from multiple industries) exist
in many zipcodes.
B.  The Census Data
The Sourcebook of Zip Code Demographics compiles the 1990 US Census
separately for every residential zipcode.  Table 1 summarizes the variables we
employ.  All variables are for 1990 unless noted otherwise.  Using the zipcode
level of aggregation is most straightforward and practical given this broad-
based study of the entire US.  Some spatial correlation of releases and
demographic characteristics undoubtedly exists, but numerically adjacent
zipcodes are often not adjacent geographically.  Therefore, accounting for this
correlation would also require a detailed geographic information system.  This
is more practical for less broad studies, such as the analysis of health risks in
Pennsylvania’s Allegheny County conducted by Glickman and Hersh (1995).
C.  Additional California Variables
We present results in Section IV. C. based on California zipcodes, after
adding two variables that that we obtained only for California—voter turnout
and vote outcomes on a specific ballot proposition.  These variables are
intended to capture the political activity and environmental preferences of
residents of different areas of the state.  Unlike the other zipcode-specific
demographic and economic characteristics described above, these data are
provided at the county level.11
11 It would be possible, in principle, to collect voter turnout data for every state; unfortunately,
such data are compiled at the state rather than federal level.  Moreover, we have not identified
a compilation of national voter turnout data with zipcode or numerical county identifiers
that are suitable for merging with the zipcode or county identifiers on the census database.
The California Secretary of State also compiles voting data at different levels of aggregation—
such as by Congressional district—but they are not compiled by zipcode.  For our analysis,
we merge the county-based voting data with the zipcode-level demographic and socio-
economic data.  We thank John Matsusaka for generously providing these voting data.
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Table 1. Description of the CENSUS data
The Sourcebook of Zip Code Demographics provides data on all residential neighborhoods in the
region. All variables are for 1990, in 1990 $.
Variable Definition
FEMHEAD Percentage of family households with a female as the head of the household
PCTFORN Percentage of foreign born residents
PCTNONWT Percentage of non-white residents (Black, American Indian, Asian/Pacific Is-
lander, Other)
PCTASIAN Percentage of residents classified as Asian/Pacific Islander
PCTNONWA Percentage of non-white and non-Asian residents (Black, American Indian,
Other)
VACANT Percentage of housing units that are vacant.  Includes housing units that were
temporarily occupied at the time of the census; seasonal or recreational units,
units for sale or rent, units rented or sold but not occupied, and new units not
occupied.
MDINCOME Median household income.  The median has been computed from the nine in-
tervals in the reported distribution of income.
POOR Percentage of residents living in poverty.  Poverty status is calculated in 1989.
Poverty thresholds are calculated from the number of persons in the family and
the number of related children under 18 years.  The average threshold for a
family of four in 1989 was $12,674;  for two persons it was $8,076.
MEDROHU Median rent paid in renter occupied housing units (dollars per month)
UNEMP Unemployment rate (in percent)
BACH Percent of population (over 25 years of age)  with bachelor’s degree
CARPOOL Percentage of workers sixteen years and older who journey to work by carpool
HHWKIDS Percentage of family households with children (below 18 years of age)
MANU Percentage of workers employed in manufacturing industries
MEDAGE Median age of residents
RENTPCT The percent of occupied housing units that are renter occupied.  Contract rent
is the monthly amount, regardless of any utilities, furnishings, or fees, that may
be included.  These renter-occupied units exclude single family homes on
more than 10 acres and renter units that are occupied without payment of cash
rent.
TOTPOP The total number of residents in an area, where residence refers to the “usual
place” where a person lives, which is not necessarily the legal residence.
PCTURB Percentage of residents living in an urban area.  Urban includes population
of places with at least 2500 persons and urbanized area.  Urbanized area con-
sists of one or more places with a minimum population of 50,000 people plus
adjacent area with a density of 1000 persons per square mile.
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We employ voter turnout from 1990, the same year as the census data.
The turnout measure is the total votes cast in the county in the 1990 general
election, as a percentage of the total 1990 population in the county.
Traditional measures of voter turnout use either eligible or registered voters
in the denominator.  We chose total population for our denominator so that
our measure captures not only the political activity of the residents, but also
level of enfranchisement of the population.  Our version differs from
traditional measures because the proportion of children, immigrants, and
others ineligible to vote varies across counties.  Our logic is that the political
influence of a population declines if either (a) the eligible voters in that
population tend to vote less often or (b) more members of that population
are ineligible to vote.  The measure we construct combines these two
components of political activity.
The proposition we chose to represent environmental preferences is
Proposition 128, popularly known as “Big Green,” which was defeated in
the 1990 general election.  The most notable feature of the proposition was
a ban on the use of pesticides that cause cancer or reproductive harm, which
would have eliminated about 350 chemicals (out of about 2,300 currently in
use).  The initiative was also wide-ranging, including a ban on new offshore
oil drilling, increased water quality standards, $300 million in bonds to buy
redwoods, and a proposal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent.
Clearly, an increase in the proportion of voters voting for proposition 128 in
a region indicates more pro-environment preferences in that region.12
D.  Model Specification
Our goal is to explain the toxic chemical releases in 1993 using the socio-
economic characteristics and 1990 releases of zipcode neighborhoods.  Most
prior research investigating the relationship between demographic variables
and environmental outcomes fails to recognize that the neighborhood
13 See Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) for a comprehensive analysis of voting behavior on a
large sample of California initiatives.
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characteristics and environmental outcomes are determined simultaneously.
A facility locates in an area, increasing the environmental risk and causing
the land and housing values of that area to decline.  Residents that choose to
live in that area may either place a low value on the environment or may
have a low income that limits their ability to locate in a less environmentally
degraded area. Our strategy to avoid this endogeneity problem is to use 1990
demographic characteristics to explain releases after 1990.  Increases in
releases occur from new facilities or expansion of existing facilities after
1990, so the 1990 demographic characteristics are most likely exogenous to
these post-1990 firm decisions.  We do acknowledge, however, that our results
are still subject to some (we believe minor) endogeneity bias if residents are
located in a given neighborhood in 1990 based on expectations of how
releases will change after 1990.13
An immediate problem that arises in constructing the dependent measure
of toxic releases is that many neighborhoods do not have any toxic chemical
releases in either 1990 or 1993.  In particular, 72 percent of the nearly 30,000
zipcodes with demographic data experienced no toxic chemical releases
according to the TRI in these years.  Simply excluding these zipcodes from
our analysis would lead to a potentially significant sample selection bias,
since these zero-release neighborhoods are obviously not a random sample
of neighborhoods.  We therefore employ a two-stage maximum likelihood
sample selection model so that our estimates of the releases equation account
for the non-random selection of the neighborhoods with any toxic chemical
releases (Heckman, 1979).  The first stage estimates a probit model, with the
dependent variable equal to 1 if the neighborhood experienced any toxic
releases in 1990 or 1993 (and 0 otherwise).  The second stage estimates our
main model (with 1993 releases as the dependent variable), adding the
13 Another approach might be to determine environmental performance by measuring
something like the level of releases per $1000 in value-added for these manufacturing
facilities.  This would involve merging detailed data from the manufacturing census, an
ambitious avenue of inquiry that we leave for future research.
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estimated likelihood of any releases for that zipcode calculated from the first
stage (or what is commonly referred to as the inverse Mill’s ratio).
The second econometric issue that arises is heteroscedasticity.  Zipcode
boundaries are designed to facilitate the delivery of mail rather than group
the population into roughly equal-sized neighborhoods; consequently, the
number of residents in each zipcode varies considerably.14  More populous
zipcode neighborhoods were more likely to experience toxic releases, and a
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test strongly rejects
homoscedasticity at better than the p=0.001 significance level.15  To account
for this heteroscedasticity in the estimates we assume that the standard
deviation in each observation is proportional to the residential population of
the zipcode neighborhood.  This assumption is translated into the econometric
estimation by weighting each observation by the inverse of the square root
of residential population.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the analysis variables.  Column
(1) presents a summary of the socio-economic characteristics of the zipcode
neighborhoods with no toxic releases in either 1990 or 1993.  Column (2)
presents this same information for the neighborhoods with positive releases
in either 1990 or 1993.
IV.  Results
Table 3 presents total toxic releases reported in the TRI for 1990 and
1993.  Nationally, releases declined by 6.5 percent.  The table also shows
that the decline in releases was more modest in the southeastern U.S., a
14 A number of entirely industrial or commercial zipcodes have no residents, so they have no
demographic data and cannot contribute to our analysis.  The most populous zipcode had
112,046 residents.
15 This test statistic is simply one-half of the explained sum of squares in the regression of
ui=ei
2/(e’e/N) - 1 on the vector of  explanatory variables.  We conducted this test based on
the second stage regression that includes the inverse Mill’s ratio to account for sample se-
lection.
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics
zipcodes with no zipcodes with
releases in 1990  positive releases
and 1993 in 1990  or 1993
(N=21215) (N=8122)
FEMHEAD Median 9.90 13.70
(Percentage of Female- Mean 11.29 16.06
Headed Family Households) Std. Dev. 6.44 8.85
PCTFORN Median 1.00 2.00
(Percentage of Foreign- Mean 2.94 4.92
Born Residents) Std. Dev. 5.79 7.90
PCTNONWT Median 2.50 6.70
(Percentage of Non-White Mean 10.56 15.90
Residents) Std. Dev. 18.03 20.61
VACANT Median 11.80 7.40
(Percentage of Housing Mean 16.32 9.35
Units that are Vacant) Std. Dev. 13.76 7.40
MDINCOME Median 24.06 26.84
(Median Household Income, Mean 26.05 28.69
in Thousands) Std. Dev. 9.66 9.63
POOR Median 13.00 11.50
(Percentage of Residents Mean 14.92 13.60
living in Poverty) Std. Dev. 9.70 9.42
MEDROHU Median 216.00 287.00
(Median Rent in Renter-Occ. Mean 265.72 327.64
Housing Units, per Month) Std. Dev. 158.28 151.10
UNEMP Median 5.70 5.80
(Unemployment Rate in Mean 6.74 6.59
Percent) Std. Dev. 4.40 3.54
BACH Median 11.10 13.20
(Percentage of Population Mean 14.51 16.41
over 25 with Bachelors Degree) Std. Dev. 10.92 10.58
CARPOOL Median 14.90 13.80
(Percentage of Labor Force over Mean 15.74 14.52
16 years old who carpool) Std. Dev. 5.92 4.72
HHWKIDS Median 50.00 51.20
(Percentage of Households Mean 49.94 51.43
with Children < 18 years) Std. Dev. 8.50 7.02
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Table 2. Summary Statistics (continued)
zipcodes with no zipcodes with
releases in 1990  positive releases
and 1993 in 1990  or 1993
MANU Median 15.30 20.30
(Percentage of Labor Force Mean 16.84 21.53
in Manufacturing Industries) Std. Dev. 10.38 9.46
MEDAGE Median 34.70 33.60
(Median Age of Residents) Mean 34.90 33.52
Std. Dev. 4.94 3.76
RENTPCT Median 21.30 28.20
(Percentage of Residents Mean 24.62 31.72
Renting Primary Residence) Std. Dev. 13.80 15.05
TOTPOP Median 1.63 13.37
(Residential Population Mean 5.04 17.43
in Thousands) Std. Dev. 9.15 14.97
SUMREL90 Median 0.00 36.74
(Toxic Releases reported Mean 0.00 408.82
for 1990, in Thousands) Std. Dev. 0.00 2966.61
SUMREL93 Median 0.00 26.30
(Toxic Releases reported Mean 0.00 382.45
for 1993, in Thousands) Std. Dev. 0.00 3110.68
PCTURB Median 0.00 74.30
(Percentage of Residents Mean 21.69 62.28
living in Urban Areas) Std. Dev. 36.78 38.10
Table 3. Total Toxic Releases Reported in the Toxics Release Inventory
(in Millions of Pounds)
Year Entire U.S. South Non-South
1990 3,905 1,518 2,387
1993 3,653 1,491 2,161
Percentage Change -6.5% -1.8% -9.5%
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region comprised of 11 states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee
and Virginia).  This difference, in part, motivated us to estimate models
separately for this region.  Section IV.B. presents these regional estimates,
following the full sample estimates in Section IV.A.
A.  Full Sample Estimates
Panel A of Table 4 contains the probit sample selection parameter
estimates, and Panel B of Table 4 contains the parameter estimates that explain
the toxic releases in 1993. Column (1) presents estimates based on all zipcodes
in the United States with any residential population.  No causality should be
inferred from the Panel A sample selection estimates; as discussed above,
the existence of toxic releases in a particular neighborhood undoubtedly
influences the decision of many residents to locate in that neighborhood,
and therefore partially explains its socio-economic characteristics.  The
sample selection equation is used merely to retrieve the inverse Mill’s ratio,
so in this discussion we focus on the Panel B estimates.16
Due to differences in state regulations as well as other differences due to
economic conditions, releases could differ across states.  We therefore include
49 state dummy variables, but suppress them in the tables to conserve space.
The omitted dummy variable is for the most populous state (California).
Fourty-six of the 49 state dummy variables are not significantly different
from zero (at the 5-percent level), indicating that fixed state effects are usually
not important.17  The remaining estimates in Table 4 Panel B are marginal
16 As shown at the bottom of Table 4, Panel B, the inverse Mill’s ratio sample selection term
is never significant.  This suggests that any sample selection bias is probably small—which
we confirm with ordinary least squares estimates shown in the Appendix.  We nevertheless
focus on the sample selection model shown in Table 4 because it is reasonable to expect a
selection bias, at least in theory.
17 The three significant state dummy variables are for Kansas (estimate=-503.8), Louisiana































































Table 4.  Estimation Results, by Region (Full Sample)
Panel A.   Stage 1.   Sample Selection Probit Equation (Dependent Variable is = 1 if Any Releases Reported)
                       U.S.                                        South                           Non-South                               California
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)        (8)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant -0.882*** (0.194) -0.364 (0.410) -1.216*** (0.241) 0.747 (0.725)
FEMHEAD 0.031*** (0.003) 0.051*** (0.006) 0.025*** (0.003) 0.007 (0.012)
PCTFORN -0.014*** (0.002) -0.026*** (0.004) -0.009*** (0.002) 0.004 (0.006)
PCTNONWT -0.007*** (0.001) -0.004** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.001) — —-
PCTASIAN — — — — — — -0.005 (0.006)
PCTNONWA — — — — — — -0.004 (0.004)
VACANT -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.017** (0.007)
MDINCOME 0.007*** (0.002) 0.010* (0.005) 0.004* (0.003) -0.007 (0.008)
POOR -0.004* (0.002) -0.016*** (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.012)
MEDROHU -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
UNEMP -0.027*** (0.004) -0.023*** (0.009) -0.027*** (0.005) 0.031 (0.020)
BACH -0.014*** (0.001) -0.023*** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.002) -0.007 (0.006)
CARPOOL -0.019*** (0.002) -0.035*** (0.005) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.004 (0.012)
HHWKIDS -0.002 (0.002) -0.006 (0.004) -0.001 (0.002) -0.012** (0.006)
MANU 0.039*** (0.001) 0.029*** (0.002) 0.046*** (0.001) 0.042*** (0.006)
MEDAGE -0.019*** (0.003) -0.016** (0.007) -0.017*** (0.004) -0.051*** (0.014)
RENTPCT 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) -0.007* (0.004)
TURN90 — — — — — — 0.001 (0.008)
PCT4_128 — — — — — — -0.008 (0.007)
TOTPOP 0.028*** (0.001) 0.049*** (0.003) 0.024*** (0.001) 0.019*** (0.003)
PCTURB 0.012*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.000) 0.009*** (0.002)
Log-Likelihood -12287 -3045 -9104                                          -658
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within-state impacts of the demographic characteristics because across-state
differences are captured by the fixed effect state dummies.
We have no prior that suggests only a linear relationship between any of
our explanatory variables and releases, and some case studies (Bullard, 1983;
GAO, 1983) have found negative environmental outcomes only when certain
factors (such as the non-white population) are very high in the local
population.  For these reasons we include squared terms for many of the
variables.  Preliminary estimates indicated that no significant non-linear
relationships for certain variables, so Table 4 presents estimates without
squared terms for those variables when the preliminary estimates indicated
a squared term coefficient that was only a small fraction of its standard error.
We also included cubic terms in preliminary regressions; these were all
insignificant except for median income, which we therefore include
(MEDINCCU).  The cubic functional form for median income permits a
sufficiently non-linear relationship to represent the inverse U-shaped
environmental Kuznets’ curve identified by Grossman and Krueger (1995)
based on a panel of cities in different countries.  The interpretation of the
curve inverse U-shaped environmental Kuznets’ curve (relating income and
an environmental indicator) is that as economic activity increases there is a
concomitant deterioration in environmental quality.  But beyond a turning
point, as income increases the demand for a cleaner environment reduces
the level of pollution.
Table 5 presents the results of Wald tests for the hypotheses that our
three classes of variables are each jointly insignificant.  Tests based on the
entire US dataset are shown in column (1).  [We discuss the other columns
after presenting the regional estimates.]  The data reject the null hypotheses
that race/gender variables and economic variables do not influence toxic
releases.  The data fail to reject the null hypothesis that our set of political/
collective action variables does not influence releases, however.  We next
consider the individual coefficient estimates in Panel B of Table 4.
The impact of the variables with non-linear specifications depends on































































Table 5. Wald Tests of Three Primary Hypotheses (Full Sample)
Null Hypothesis: All variables in each group are jointly equal to zero
                        Geographic Areas
Variable Group US South Non-South California
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Race/Gender 39.12 41.08 6.94 4.70
(5 variables) (<0.001)  (<0.001))  (0.23)  (0.70)
Economic 40.04 41.07 4.60 5.22
(9 variables) (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.87) (0.81)
Political/Collective Action 5.22 11.13 13.30 11.33
(8 variables) (0.73)  (0.19)  (0.10)  (0.33)
Notes:  All test statistics are distributed as Chi-Squared under the null hypothesis (degrees of freedom equal to the number
of variables indicated for each variable group, except for the California model).  P-values indicated in parentheses.  The














































Note:  All estimated impacts are shown
for the range of the variable between
the 1st and 99th percentile in the US.
Figure 1. Estimated Impact on 1993 Releases (Non.linear Variables)
Note: All estimated impacts are shown
for the range of the variable between
the 1st and 99th percentile in the US.
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non-linear variables to aid in their interpretation.18  In all cases the figure
only displays the estimated impact for the range of the explanatory variable
between the first and 99th percentile in the data.  For example, we only
display the impact of POOR below 50 percent, because the 99th percentile
(across zipcodes) of the percentage of residents living in poverty is
approximately 50 percent.
Consider first the race/gender variables.  Releases are estimated to increase
with the percentage of non-white population, once this percentage exceeds
the turning point of approximately 22 percent.  By contrast, releases generally
fall with increases in the percentage of female-headed households, contrary
to one possible view of environmental discrimination.  Many of the economic
variables also impact releases.  Figure 1 shows that releases increase with
increasing median household income.  This general shape is not inconsistent
with the inverse U-shaped environmental Kuznets’ curve presented by
Grossman and Krueger (1995) because of the variance in our parameter
estimates.19  Neighborhoods with a greater percentage of residents living in
poverty (POOR) experience greater releases than less poverty-stricken
neighborhoods.  Finally, neighborhoods with high unemployment (above
about 10 percent) experience fewer releases than low unemployment
neighborhoods, as do neighborhoods with high residential vacancy rates (see
Table 4 Panel B). These last two effects are due probably to generally
depressed local economic conditions.
18 Figures 1 and 2 are adjusted for the likelihood of a neighborhood experiencing any releases,
from the Stage 1 models.
19 For example, if the MEDINCSQ estimate fell by only -0.30 (only one-third of its standard
error) to -2.71, the income-releases relationship would exhibit an inverse U-shape.  We also
explored the relationship between releases and median income, not controlling for all of the
other demographic factors in our model.  This is analogous to some reduced form estimates
provided for developing countries.  These estimates (not reported here) indicate a standard
inverse U-shape, with a relatively low turning point at approximately the median income of
$20,000.
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B.  Southeastern US Estimates
The remaining columns of Table 4 present estimation results when
segmenting the US into different regions.  The estimates shown in column
(3) are for the 11 southeastern states defined above, and the estimates shown
in column (5) are for the remaining 39 states.20  We were motivated to segment
the US into geographic areas to capture potential regional differences
influencing environmental outcomes.
Many parameter estimates differ in the two regions.  In the South, the
non-white population percentage significantly affects releases, while this
variable is insignificant outside the South.  Figure 2 illustrates that our model
estimates for the South imply substantially higher releases for those
neighborhoods with a large non-white population.  [The Non-South estimated
impact is shown for comparison, although this variable is not statistically
significant in the Non-South dataset.]  The other economic variables identified
as significant at the 5-percent level in the full sample are also significant in
the South sub-sample, with identical signs.  These economic variables are
insignificant in the Non-South sub-sample, however.
The Wald tests shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 indicate that the
southeastern US data reject the null hypotheses that the race/gender variables
and the economic variables do not affect releases.  The data do not reject the
hypothesis that the set of political/collective action variables does not affect
releases for the South.  In the Non-South data, none of the three null
hypotheses are rejected.
C. California Estimates
The remaining results are based on the sub-sample of California zipcodes
and are shown in column (7) of Table 4.  This specification differs from the
20 In the Non-South regression the omitted state is again California.  In the South regression
the omitted state is Florida.  Nine of the ten remaining state dummies in the South regression














































































Figure 2. Estimated Impact of Non-White Population Percentage:
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previous estimates in two ways.  First, we specify the race variables slightly
differently.  As mentioned above, the correlation between the percentage of
non-white residents and certain economic variables is substantial.  For
example, in the overall sample, the correlation coefficient between the
percentage of non-white residents and the percentage of households living
in poverty is 0.46.  Fortunately, the data indicate that one minority group
does not have this high correlation with economic characteristics:  Asians.
Unfortunately for our purposes, the percentage of Asian residents nationally
is quite small, averaging 1.2 percent across zipcodes.  This makes identifying
an independent impact for this racial group unlikely based on the entire US
sample.
However, the percentage of Asian residents is significantly greater in
more racially diverse California, averaging 6.4 percent across zipcodes.  This
percentage also varies substantially across zipcodes in California and is
uncorrelated with the percentage of residents living in poverty (the estimated
correlation coefficient is -0.01).  Therefore, the California specification in
column (7) separates the non-white population percentage into two categories:
percent Asian (PCTASIAN) and percent non-white and non-Asian
(PCTNONWA).  The results indicate whether an independent Asian effect
is evident in the release data, and due to the nature of the data this effect is
orthogonal to our poverty measures.
The second difference in the California estimates is the addition of two
new variables: voter turnout (TURN90) and voting outcomes on Proposition
128 (PCT4_128), a wide-ranging initiative to improve environmental
conditions.  Voter turnout (defined as the percentage of residents that cast
votes in the 1990 general election) ranged from 15 to 42 percent, with a
mean of 28 and a median of 27 percent.  The percentage of residents voting
in favor of Proposition 128 ranged from 12 to 62 percent, with a mean of 33
and a median of 32 percent.  As discussed above, these variables capture the
political activity and environmental preferences of local residents.
Similar to the Non-South estimates, most of the variables in this model
based only on California are insignificant.  The key results from the California
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model are the following.  First, the percentage of Asian residents as well as
all other race/gender variables do not explain releases.  Second, increased
voter turnout has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on releases.
Third, vote outcomes on proposition 128 have no impact on releases.  The
Wald tests based on California (column (4) of Table 5) indicate that none of
the three joint null hypotheses are rejected.
D.  Non-Urban Estimates
Due to land availability, population density and other factors, changes in
release patterns may differ substantially between rural and urban areas.21
The demographic composition of non-urban neighborhoods also varies
considerably in different areas of the country.  For example, as we document
below, racial minorities represent a large portion of residents in some rural
areas of the southeastern US, but elsewhere minority residents are more
commonly concentrated in urban areas.  If increases in toxic releases are
more likely or less likely to be economically feasible in non-urban areas, the
environmental impact on minority residents might differ across regions.  The
results previously presented in section IV. B. indicate that in the southeastern
states, neighborhoods with a higher proportion of non-white residents are
more likely to suffer from an increase in toxic releases.  This section
investigates whether this pattern could be due primarily to an increase in
releases in non-urban areas, rather than to differences in neighborhood racial
compositions.  In particular, Table 6 reports estimates of the same models
shown previously in Table 4, but for only non-urban zipcodes.  We show
that the key result concerning the concentration of minority residents is
stronger when considering only non-urban zipcodes.  This suggests that the
increase in minority exposures in the South is not due mainly to an increase
in releases in rural areas.
21 We are grateful to the editor for encouraging us to investigate the changing release patterns
of non-urban areas.
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We exclude the predominantly urban zipcodes by dropping those in which
more than 90 percent of the residents live in an “urban area.”22   The average
population of the 23,354 zipcodes that satisfy this criterion is 4,671, compared
to an average population of 23,306 for the 5,978 predominantly urban
zipcodes.  Non-white residents comprise more than 20 percent of the
population in about 37 percent of the non-urban zipcodes in the South; by
contrast, non-white residents comprise more than 20 percent of the population
in only about 7 percent of the non-urban zipcodes outside the South.  This
discussion will focus on the Panel B results of Table 6, as well as the non-
urban Wald test statistics reported in Table 7.
The results for the non-urban zipcodes are somewhat different from the
full sample results.  Consider first the race/gender variables.  As in the full
sample, the percentage of non-white residents affects releases primarily in
the South.  However, Figure 2 illustrates that the estimated increase in releases
for predominantly non-white neighborhoods is more pronounced in southern,
non-urban areas.  In (unreported) estimates for urban zipcodes in the South,
the percentage of non-white residents does not significantly affect releases.
The evidence that minorities face increased exposures is therefore confined
to non-urban areas of the South.
The second major difference in the non-urban sample is that many
political/collective action variables are significantly different from zero.  The
Wald test statistics shown in Table 7 also indicate that this set of political/
collective action variables significantly affect releases in non-rural areas,
contrary to the full sample tests shown in Table 5.  In the South, surprisingly
releases tend to be greater for non-urban neighborhoods that contain a greater
fraction of households with children.  The non-urban estimates for the South
also indicate marginally significant impacts of the percentage of residents
employed in manufacturing industries and the number of residents who
22 For census purposes, an urbanized area consists of one or more places with a minimum
































































Table 6.  Estimation Results, by Region (Non-Urban Sample)
Panel A:  Stage 1: Sample Selection Probit Equation (Dependent Variable is = 1 if Any Releases Reported)
            U.S.              South             Non-South                California
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant -1.806*** (0.262) -0.891* (0.540) -2.235*** (0.312) 1.970 (1.321)
FEMHEAD 0.067*** (0.004) 0.079*** (0.009) 0.064*** (0.006) 0.017 (0.029)
PCTFORN 0.008* (0.004) 0.007 (0.014) 0.008* (0.005) 0.021 (0.014)
PCTNONWT -0.009*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.002) — —-
PCTASIAN — — — — — — -0.008 (0.031)
PCTNONWA — — — — — — -0.015 (0.010)
VACANT -0.002** (0.001) -0.003 (0.003) -0.003* (0.001) -0.020* (0.011)
MDINCOME 0.007** (0.003) 0.016** (0.007) 0.004 (0.004) -0.014 (0.017)
POOR -0.019*** (0.003) -0.021*** (0.005) -0.014*** (0.003) 0.008 (0.022)
MEDROHU -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
UNEMP -0.028*** (0.005) -0.009 (0.010) -0.039*** (0.006) 0.006 (0.029)
BACH -0.015*** (0.002) -0.025*** (0.005) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.003 (0.013)
CARPOOL -0.027*** (0.003) -0.035*** (0.005) -0.022*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.018)
HHWKIDS -0.002 (0.003) -0.013** (0.006) -0.001 (0.003) -0.025** (0.012)
MANU 0.036*** (0.001) 0.028*** (0.002) 0.044*** (0.002) 0.044*** (0.013)
MEDAGE -0.002 (0.004) -0.014* (0.009) 0.002 (0.005) -0.059** (0.027)
RENTPCT 0.013*** (0.002) 0.009** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.009)
TURN90 — — — — — — -0.011 (0.014)
PCT4_128 — — — — — — -0.022 (0.015)
TOTPOP 0.070*** (0.002) 0.077*** (0.004) 0.067*** (0.003) 0.051*** (0.008)
PCTURB 0.009*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) 0.008** (0.003)































Table 6  (continued).  Estimation Results, by Region (Non-Urban Sample)
Panel B:  Stage 2: Dependent Variable is 1993 Releases (in Thousands of Pounds)
                       U.S.                      South                        Non-South                   California
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant -5915.00*** (1051.70) -9530.20*** (2179.10) -1164.30 (1021.10) 2367.20 (2002.20)
            Race/Gender Variables
FEMHEAD -19.54 (30.12) -56.82 (79.76) -5.55 (25.70) -211.67* (124.59)
FEMHEDSQ -0.42 (0.78) -0.56 (1.80) -0.24 (0.84) 7.25* (3.89)
PCTFORN 7.73 (13.55) 31.99 (48.02) -15.36 (10.04) -11.87 (21.98)
PCTNONWT -41.17*** (7.81) -63.16*** (14.88) -1.25 (7.73) — —-
PCTNWTSQ 0.98*** (0.11) 1.39*** (0.21) 0.09 (0.12) — —-
PCTASIAN — — — — — — -35.22 (73.38)
PCTASQ — — — — — — 3.37 (4.59)
PCTNONWA — — — — — — -33.68 (22.68)
PCTNWASQ — — — — — — 0.18 (0.25)
            Economic  Variables
VACANT -5.59 (3.72) -25.95** (13.22) -2.46 (2.43) -40.58** (16.85)
MDINCOME 237.27*** (60.39) 424.10* (227.91) -14.02 (45.79) 126.08 (236.75)
MEDINCSQ -5.98*** (1.68) -10.64 (8.10) 0.34 (1.23) -4.91 (6.78)
MEDINCCU 0.05*** (0.01) 0.08 (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) 0.06 (0.06)
POOR -14.42 (19.26) -33.95 (53.78) -2.96 (13.99) 189.39*** (71.96)
POORSQ 1.10** (0.45) 2.36** (1.05) 0.21 (0.36) -5.68*** (2.06)
MEDROHU -0.81 (0.57) -0.71 (1.53) -0.11 (0.43) 1.25 (1.28)
UNEMP 119.30*** (36.68) 270.45*** (93.79) 14.72 (29.17) -122.03 (77.13)
UNEMPSQ -9.45*** (2.01) -21.69*** (4.90) -0.97 (1.66) 5.13* (2.65)
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Table 7. Wald Tests of Three Primary Hypotheses (Non-Urban Sample)Z
Null Hypothesis: All variables in each group are jointly equal to zero
                                  Geographic Areas
Variable Group US South Non-South California
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Race/Gender 100.70 62.38 3.50 12.92
(5 variables) (<0.001)  (<0.001))  (0.62)  (0.07)
Economic 44.76 45.40 3.45 19.64
(9 variables)  (<0.001)  (<0.001)  (0.94)  (0.02)
Political/Collective Action 27.07 18.89 19.04 39.46
(8 variables)  (<0.001)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (<0.001)
Notes:  All test statistics are distributed as Chi-Squared under the null hypothesis (degrees of freedom equal to the
number of variables indicated for each variable group, except for the California model).  P-values indicated in
parentheses.  The number of restrictions for the California model (column 4) is 7 for Race/Gender, 9 for economic
and 10 for political/collective action.
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carpool.  The non-urban estimates for the non-southern states (column 5 of
Table 6, Panel B) indicate that releases are lower in neighborhoods with a
higher percentage of adults with bachelor’s degrees.  Finally, the non-urban
estimates for California indicate that releases are lower in neighborhoods
where a higher percentage of workers use carpools.
In summary, these estimates based on only non-urban zipcodes suggest
that residents in predominantly non-white, southern rural areas were exposed
to more toxic releases than their urban counterparts.  The results fail to support
the hypothesis that the greater releases estimated for southern non-white
neighborhoods are due mainly to the greater releases that may occur in non-
urban areas.  The results also indicate that our political/collective action
variables have a greater influence on releases in non-urban areas, which is
an intriguing finding that warrants future study.
E. Alternative Specifications
In this subsection we briefly discuss several alternative model
specifications, although we do not report them in detail here in order to
conserve space.
The TRI reports transfers (or “shipments”) of toxic chemicals, which are
typically directed toward publicly owned treatment works (POTW).  The
accounting of these transfers has been more accurate than the accounting of
releases, at least in the early years of the TRI.  In recent years these off-site
transfers have been growing dramatically.  For example, while toxic releases
fell by 6.5 percent between 1990 and 1993 (see Table 3), toxic transfers
increased by more than 200 percent—from 1.16 billion to 3.86 billion pounds.
While this reflects an overall increase in the generation of toxic chemicals,
these transfers remove the toxic chemicals from the local environment and
are often associated with reduced local environmental releases.  Consequently,
increases in transfers often improve the local environment, unlike increases
in releases.
We were unable to find strong evidence that transfers are closely related
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to  the demographic and economic characteristics of the zipcode
neighborhood surrounding manufacturing facilities.  We estimated a set of
sample selection models similar to those shown in Table 4, except with 1993
transfers replacing releases as the dependent variable (and 1990 transfers
replacing releases as a control explanatory variable). The overall fit of the
models was poor, as  reflected in adjusted R-square  statistics that were below
0.01 for the entire U.S., the South and the Non-South datasets.  Individual
coefficient estimates were significantly different from zero only rarely.23
We also investigated whether systematic initial underreporting or
overreporting of releases might be able to explain our finding that releases
tended to increase between 1990 and 1993 in non-urban, southern zipcodes
with a high proportion of non-white residents.  Some small firms initially
may have failed to comply with reporting requirements.24  If these
underreported releases varied systematically by region (and with demographic
or economic characteristics of the zipcodes), then our results could be biased.
To reduce any bias due to underreporting, we divided facilities into three
classes: (1) those with positive releases or transfers reported in both 1990
and 1993; (2) those with positive releases or transfers only in 1990 (but no
data reported in 1993); and, (3) those with positive releases or transfers only
in 1993 (but no data reported in 1990). This last group might be non-reporting
23 We also estimated a model with total 1993 releases and transfers as the dependent variable—
which is a measure of overall toxic chemical “generation” in the zipcode.  The demographic
and economic characteristics in this model can explain some of the variation in generation
across zipcodes (e.g., the adjusted R-square is 0.33 for the entire U.S. dataset); however, the
coefficient estimates are difficult to interpret because—as discussed above—increases in
releases can harm the local environment while increases in transfers can improve the local
environment.
24 Brehm and Hamilton (1996) find that in Minnesota, small firms that generated small
amounts of toxic chemicals were most likely to fail to file TRI reports in 1991.  They attribute
such noncompliance to ignorance rather than (strategic) evasion of the law.  We are grateful
to an anonymous referee for suggesting that we study the impact of under and over reporting.
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in 1990, and by 1993 they had begun to comply with the TRI reporting
requirements.25
We estimated the same models reported above on only the facilities in
group (1) (i.e., those reporting in both years), to determine if our main
conclusions continue to hold on a dataset with less potential bias from
underreporting.  Our conclusions tend to be somewhat weaker, but they hold
up qualitatively.  For the full U.S. dataset, the percentage of non-white
residents does not significantly affect releases, although this variable
continues to affect releases significantly in the southeastern states estimates.
The main difference in the results for this sub-sample of facilities is that the
percentage of residents who use carpools significantly affects releases, and
this makes the political/collective action Wald test statistics significant in
the entire U.S. estimates as well as the estimates for the southeastern states.
Finally, we also reestimated the models after disaggregating releases by
pollution media.  Our main results in Table 4 are based on total releases,
which include releases to air, surface water, underground injections and land.
It is possible that race, economic and collective action influences affect these
kinds of releases differently, due perhaps to public and regulator scrutiny
that differs depending on the type of pollution.  About 45 percent of releases
are to air, so not surprisingly the air release estimates generally parallel those
in Table 4.  The main difference is that median income is not significant in
any of the air release estimates.  In addition, in the air release model estimated
for the southeastern states, the estimated impact of the percentage of non-
white residents is much smaller in magnitude, although it remains statistically
significant.  Water and land releases represent about 18 percent and about 8
percent of the total releases, but our set of economic and demographic
characteristics fail to explain releases in these media.  Individual coefficients
are rarely statistically different from zero in any estimates.  Finally, facilities
25 Of course, many of the facilities in group (3) are new facilities that began releasing toxic
chemicals between 1990 and 1993, and many of the facilities in group (2) were closed
between 1990 and 1993.
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release toxic chemicals by underground injection in only about 1 percent of
the zipcodes, although by weight, releases of this type represent about 29
percent of the total.  The small number of zipcodes experiencing underground
releases leads to unreliable or unsuccessful estimation results for the sample
selection model.
V. Summary
This paper presents a reduced form statistical analysis of the relationship
between environmental outcomes and neighborhood characteristics
throughout the United States.  We also conduct regional regressions within
the United States to capture differences across geographic areas.  Our
approach uses the level of toxic chemical releases in 1993 as the measure of
environmental performance, based on the Toxics Release Inventory, and we
control for 1990 releases.  The 1990 US Census provides the data on
neighborhood characteristics, and the analysis is conducted at the zipcode
level.  The goal is to distinguish between three alternative explanations for
differences in environmental outcomes—race/gender influences, an economic
(Coasian) explanation, and an explanation based on political/collective action.
Many economic variables significantly impact releases for the overall
sample and within the southeastern states.  The estimates based on the entire
US indicate that releases increase as income increases, but the imprecision
of our estimates does not rule out the possible existence of an inverse U-
shaped Environmental Kuznets’ curve (i.e., a reduction in releases with
increasing income once income exceeds some threshold).  Releases also tend
to by lower in areas with high unemployment rates.
While the scope of our inquiry was much broader than a simple search for
environmental injustice, our most provocative finding is that race appears to
be an important determinant of  releases in the South.  This result seems
confined to non-urban areas, which contain high concentrations of minority
residents mainly in the South.  This pattern of increased releases in minority
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areas controls for many other economic and collective action variables, and
it is not observed outside the South or in predominantly urban areas.  This
finding has important implications for the debate on environmental equity,
and is consistent with case study evidence.26
While our study provides some statistical evidence of environmental
inequity, it also provides some evidence of the potential power of collective
action.  Outside of the urban centers and also most prominently in the
southeast, the variables that proxy political/collective action incentives and
preferences significantly influence environmental outcomes.  This suggests
that raising awareness and providing information to the affected rural,
southern communities may be a significant step in improving environmental
performance in areas that may suffer from environmental injustice.
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Appendix. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Results, by Region (Full Sample)
Dependent Variable is 1993 Releases (in Thousands of Pounds)
                     U.S.                         South                         Non-South                 California
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant -1753.30*** (486.61) -5897.10*** (1502.10) 314.36 (365.89) 671.96 (1537.80)
Race/GenderVariables
FEMHEAD 8.93 (12.65) 11.41 (39.75) -4.51 (9.55) -61.28 (58.87)
FEMHEDSQ -0.63*** (0.21) -1.19** (0.60) -0.02 (0.16) 1.08 (1.13)
PCTFORN -6.90 (5.44) 3.32 (18.97) -6.41 (3.96) -12.36 (12.51)
PCTNONWT -10.40** (4.76) -39.66*** (11.58) 0.50 (3.95)
PCTNWTSQ 0.27*** (0.06) 0.79*** (0.14) -0.02 (0.05)
PCTASIAN — — -10.71 (28.19)
PCTASQ — — 0.21 (0.66)
PCTNONWA — — -6.91 (18.17)
PCTNWASQ — — -0.05 (0.20)
             Economic  Variables
VACANT -5.07* (2.93) -22.77* (11.95) -2.16 (1.94) -13.30 (15.75)
MDINCOME 110.56*** (34.46) 362.31*** (138.39) -11.71 (24.57) 109.48 (141.25)
MEDINCSQ -2.46*** (0.91) -8.33* (4.37) 0.28 (0.63) -3.16 (3.94)
MEDINCCU 0.02** (0.01) 0.06 (0.04) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03 (0.03)
POOR -6.89 (11.87) -48.99 (42.77) 5.32 (8.22) 45.07 (47.89)
POORSQ 0.77** (0.24) 2.37*** (0.77) -0.08 (0.18) -0.90 (0.95)
MEDROHU -0.54 (0.36) -1.06 (1.33) -0.17 (0.25) 0.07 (1.05)
UNEMP 37.60* (21.01) 232.09*** (75.37) 5.49 (15.37) -96.23 (99.10)


































































                  U.S.                         South                         Non-South                 California
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
                             Political/Collective
                              Action Variables
BACH 0.39 (3.75) 6.12 (13.10) -4.82* (2.59) -19.66 (12.39)
CARPOOL 26.38 (20.28) 93.49 (70.55) 0.69 (14.16) -36.43 (53.35)
CARPOLSQ -0.48 (0.54) -2.18 (1.70) 0.29 (0.40) 0.62 (0.98)
HHWKIDS 5.96 (20.30) 37.42 (57.19) -3.89 (15.29) -14.69 (53.78)
HHWKIDSQ -0.10 (0.21) -0.54 (0.61) 0.01 (0.16) 0.35 (0.52)
MANU -8.19*** (2.82) -16.44** (7.85) -1.70 (2.17) 5.44 (11.62)
MEDAGE 9.52 (7.95) 3.13 (25.99) 3.97 (5.71) 5.69 (27.34)
RENTPCT 3.40 (2.92) 18.38* (10.21) 1.85 (2.03) 10.11 (9.25)
TURN90 — — -17.91 (15.13)
PCT4_128 — — 11.72 (12.24)
          Control Variables
TOTPOP 1.58 (2.28) 0.67 (7.66) 3.83** (1.56) 0.76 (4.42)
1990 Releases 0.94*** (0.01) 1.07*** (0.01) 0.61*** (0.01) 0.34*** (0.08)
PCTURB -6.68*** (2.27) -9.29 (6.82) -0.10 (1.62) -26.54** (11.91)
PCTURBSQ 0.06** (0.02) 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.02) 0.22* (0.12)
Number of Observations 8121 2052 6069 474
Adjusted R2 0.735 0.813 0.529 0.042
Notes:  * denotes significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level; ** denotes significantly different from zero at the 5
percent level; *** denotes significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level (all two-tailed tests).
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